A Feminist Methodology of the Personal:

Bisexual Experience and Feminist Post-structuralist Epistemology


This paper comes out the research for my forthcoming book Bisexual Spaces: the Limits of Queer Terrain which examines the centrality of bisexual location for contemporary theories of sexuality and gender. My work investigates the abstract production of bisexuality as middle-ground supporting oppositional structures of sexuality and gender, and traces alternative, concrete sites of bisexual production in contemporary spaces. It offers a challenge to a feminist queer repudiative model that relies on but does not name bisexuality, and suggests alternative configurations of gender and sexuality that emerge from a displacement of a bisexual middle-ground. In the process of conducting this research within a women’s studies department, it also became clear to me that theorising bisexuality poses specific challenges to and temporary resolutions of ongoing debates about feminist epistemology and methodology, and in particular the question of "experience" for both the researcher and researched. In brief, and as I will outline below, this paper emphasises the importance of post-structuralist feminist epistemology for providing a framework to make sense of the everyday, situated experiences of bisexual subjects. The nature of bisexual social existence is always partial, most often experienced within communities that do not recognise bisexuality as discrete (or viable), and filtered through competing discourses of identity. I will argue that without feminist post-structuralist perspectives, it is not possible to make sense of the peculiarities of bisexual social and political existence, since there are no finite sexual or social practices that adhere to or inhere in a bisexual identity.

My intervention here is also intended to reflect my frustration and dissatisfaction with feminist debate where it proceeds as if post-structuralist approaches are in necessary opposition to the materialist feminist desire to highlight the lived experiences (i.e. the ways we are ontologically and epistemological situated) of women. Not only do I believe, with Elspeth Probyn, that gendered and sexual experience needs to be more fully theorised (16-17), I also contend that the failure to develop models of experience as partial, fragmented and contradictory limits our ability to make sense of and thus transform gendered social reality. A feminist epistemology that maintains a priori assumptions about what constitutes gendered or sexual experience, and thus subjective location, is necessarily attuned only to dominant gendered and sexual subjective formations, and is ill-equipped to produce ethical research on subjects whose knowledges are produced from a variety of different social locations. An endlessly reproduced "split" between theory and politics within feminism, where these terms are sloppily mapped onto post-structuralist theoretical approaches on the one hand, and empirical research on women’s lives on the other, results in an impasses that forecloses consideration of bisexual subjectivity. In effect, I want to argue that when Marilyn Frye states that bisexuality is "a good example of inauthenticity in a lesbian" (Frye 216, qtd in Fraser 39), or when Elisabeth Wilson insists that bisexuality has no subjective integrity, but rather masquerades as either heterosexuality or homosexuality (112-3), these positions mark a failure of epistemology, as well as expressing a myopic view of contemporary social and political landscapes. As a transitive subjectivity bisexuality will thus always be theorised as "something else" at the same time as lesbian, gay or straight subjectivity becomes overburdened with "lived realities" that do not resonate with their specific sexed, gendered and sexual experiences. The effect of this is to sideline bisexuality while homogenising other more recognisable sexual subject positions.

As a final introductory note, any reader well versed in contemporary feminist and queer epistemological discussions cannot fail to notice that I mix and match references to sexual and gendered epistemologies here. Queer epistemologists have, of course, made a series of convincing arguments for analysing gender and sexuality (what Sedgwick calls "sex") separately. Heavily influenced by Rubin’s "Thinking Sex" queer theorists have pointed to the ways in which feminists frequently subsume "the sexual" under "gender" as an area of concern on the basis that oppressive sexual relations are the effect of oppressive gender relations. As a result epistemologies of sexuality are relegated to the realm of "special interest." In response, queer theorists provide genealogies of the effects of a Western homosexual/heterosexual dyad, insisting that the concerns of feminist and queer theorists are not always the same, or even mutually supportive (Holland; Merck et al). While I agree with the queer project of foregrounding the central role of sexual discourse in the formation of contemporary subjectivity, one of its side effects in turn can be to reduce feminist inquiry to the pursuit of gendered meaning only. Thus, Abelove, Barale and Halperin’s much cited contention that "Lesbian/gay studies does for sex and sexuality approximately what women’s studies does for gender" (xv) – gains resonance almost perversely at a time when to speak of "gender" as the privileged object of feminist inquiry is rendered unacceptably exclusionary within feminism itself. Perhaps more importantly, Judith Butler reminds us that such a distinction between the "proper objects" of feminist and queer inquiry can only have a circular effect, epistemologically ensuring that feminism "remain" heterosexist in its concern for gender equality above all else, and positioning queer feminist theorists as the most virulent critics of feminism as if they themselves lay no claim to being feminist theorists (Against Proper Objects 1).

My own reasons for resisting a theoretical split between the proper objects of feminist and queer studies in my own work are twofold. Firstly, I seek to respond to Braidotti’s insistence that postmodern feminist epistemologists need to pay (visionary) attention to the contradictions played out in transitions between sites, rather than situating themselves exclusively within a single domain (16, 35, 98). In this respect it is hardly surprising that the writers I have found most useful in developing a framework for bisexual feminist epistemology and methodology – Haraway, Probyn, Braidotti, Butler – are themselves queer feminist scholars, each concerned to articulate an understanding of the subject-in-process (whether cyborg, performative or nomad) who is formed "through experience" (Probyn 3) and not prior to it. Secondly, the terrain of my own inquiry is fused through the trope of the bisexual woman, whose experiences can never be posed, even theoretically, as either primarily gendered or primarily sexual, and who negotiates lesbian/feminist subjects who also resist the splitting of gendered and sexual epistemologies.

Post-Structuralist Feminist Epistemology

Before moving on to look in more depth at the intersection of bisexual research and post-structuralist feminist epistemology, I want briefly to give an indication of the parameters of the approaches I am concerned with. Despite my warning in note 1 of merely gesturing towards arenas of theory I am not directly engaging with, I do not wish to retrace already well trodden paths within approaches to feminist epistemology here. Thus I will not be rehearsing debates about feminist standpoint and the challenges to "experience" as the authentic ground of feminist intervention here, wanting instead to indicate what I consider to be the most productive points of engagement between feminist post-structuralist theories and my own research.

One of the myths surrounding feminist post-structuralist perspectives is that experience is no longer considered a valuable category of analysis, being replaced by attention to a free-floating "gender performance" not grounded in the female body. In fact, though, the category of experience is anything but abandoned by feminist post-structuralist theorists, and particularly epistemologists, who pay careful attention to the different ways in which experience might be theorised, and its importance for feminist subjectivity. Thus Probyn urges feminists to subject "experience" to particularly rigorous analysis, not in order to displace its central role in feminist thinking, but so that it can remain a productive site of engagement. Probyn begins this project by proposing that we make an analytical distinction between ontological and epistemological experiences of "being sexed," where at an ontological level, the concept of experience posits a separate realm of existence – it testifies to the gendered, sexual and racial facticity of being in the social… [and]… [a]t an epistemological level, the self is revealed in its conditions of possibility; here experience is recognized as more obviously discursive and can be used overtly to politicize the ontological (16).

The reflexive and progressive self, for Probyn, emerges as an effect of the tension between these levels (17). The dissonance between how we know we are gendered (ontology), and the limits and possibilities of what that gendered knowing means (epistemology) gives rise to a politically engaged and self-reflexive feminist subject. Similarly, for Braidotti, what marks a postmodern conception of the female subject is her formation through translation and negotiation of difference rather than through recognition of sameness. Our subjectivities are not static grounds of certain knowledge but the endlessly renewed and renewable result of connections with other people, places and their expressions. Bradotti figures this contemporary feminist subject as a nomad whose transitions are not the site of her undoing, but are "precisely the reason why she can make connections at all. Nomadic politics is a matter of bonding, of coalitions, of interconnections" (35).

Despite the enormous differences of approach within post-structuralist feminist accounts of the relationship between experience and subjectivity, what they have in common is their emphasis on the partiality and transitory nature of experience that cannot be known in advance (Haraway, Situated Knowledges 192), but are rather an effect of power relations. As for earlier standpoint theorists knowledge derives from experience, but the argument is for "politics and epistemologies of location, positioning, and situating, where partiality and not universality is the condition of being heard to make rational knowledge claims" (195). The theorists I am engaging with here are particularly careful to stress that partiality, difference and transition are distinct from sloppy relativism, allowing for accountability in the present, rather than an assumption of pre-determined hierarchical difference. It is the situating of these knowledges (Ibid.), the tracking of nomadic trails (Bradotti), the politicising of differences within experience (Probyn) that allows us to see how the self is engendered, and what the effects of this engendering are. In other words, one cannot assume in advance which subjects and knowledges will have foreclosing and which transformative effects. For all these theorists, engagement across embodied differences forms the basis for political and ethical action, and is the starting point for forming coalitions and/or transforming existing agendas.

Of course, such epistemological perspectives have enormous impact on which methodologies we use to conduct research on those same gendered subjectivities. The questions we ask must necessarily be other than "what is the woman’s experience in this context?" or even "what is the feminist reading of this same context?" as these assume that there is a single experience or a single reading that will be identifiable and knowable. Instead, the task is to examine the knowledges that emerge from interactions among and between subjects, and to assess the political and ethical value of such knowledges; as Sedgwick suggests "[r]epeatedly to ask how certain categorizations work, what enactments they are performing and what relations they are creating, rather than what they essentially mean" (27). This process is one of feminist genealogy, a way of tracing knowledges at odds with dominant discourses, rather than knowledges we see at first glance. Inevitably this will often involve tracing lack of knowledge, or taking the assumed knowledge of the critic as object. For Halberstam, for example, queer genealogy (or "perverse presentism" as Sedgwick calls it) means to question "in the first what we think we already know, and then … move back toward the question of what we think we have found when we alight on historical records" in her case of "so called lesbian desire"(53). These post-structuralist feminist epistemologies and methodologies are not at odds with feminism or "anti-feminist." They are part of a time-honoured feminist tradition of challenging established "truths" about gender and sexuality, and their aim is to identify the barriers to a politically engaged feminist subjectivty, and create myriad languages through which progressive female subjectivity is/can be thought.

Bisexual Epistemology

In light of the above, what could easily be the first question when thinking about bisexuality – "What is bisexual experience?" – is necessarily displaced as impossible to answer and a different set of questions asked. Rather, in line with the theorists I have been discussing, I have asked instead: "What different bisexual knowledges circulate currently, and what do they allow and disallow?" "What subjugated (bisexual) knowledges can we trace in order for a bisexual genealogy to have resonance in the present?" "Between which differences does bisexual female subjectivity emerge, and how can this help us make ethical feminist interpretations?"

In contrast to much identity-based bisexual theory, which enacts the desire for an intact linear history of elided bisexuals, and seeks to establish the unique and discrete character of bisexual subjectivity and experience, my own research stresses the importance of considering bisexual knowledges as they are formed through association with/in other sexual and gendered experiences. In part this is because of what I perceive to be a generalisable problem with identity politics in terms of its implicit endorsement of history as progressively more inclusive, with its never-ending necessity for identifying the next excluded other to be incorporated. This search for inclusion of sexual and gendered subjects, ever the same, suggests the political problem is one of omission rather than of structure, a failure of historical and cultural memory, rectifiable by "remembering" (in this case) bisexuality and setting the historical record straight. Further, more specific problems with the theorisation of bisexual identity qua identity emerge. In the attempt to delineate bisexuality as uniquely oppressed, it has been common to situate bisexuality as the oppressed half of the monosexism binary, where "monosexual" behaviour (the desire for a single gender) is socially and politically naturalised at the expense of "bisexual" behaviour. Such a move, to return to Probyn’s distinction cited above (15-16), privileges the ontological aspects of (bisexual) experience over its epistemological aspects and thus fails to engage the political inequalities between same-sex and opposite-sex desire. This location of bisexual subjectivity within the monosexism binary appears blissfully ignorant of the political, discursive conditions of its own production. As suggested above, my concern with the processes of "becoming-bisexual" leads me to theorise what I instead perceive as the consistent partiality of bisexual experience, and thus the consistent presence of bisexuality in the formation of "other" sexual and gendered subjectivities.

As I have already indicated, the partiality of bisexual subjectivity is commonly construed as evidence of its "inauthenticity." Bisexuality is thus understood as unfinished – either as a pre-Oedipal potential that will allow for, or become, same or opposite sex object choice, or as a contemporary vacillation that will always change and cannot remain static (a bisexual will always leave you, it is just a question of when). The temptation on the part of bisexual theorists to insist that bisexual subjectivity can be traced as distinctly and authentically bisexual is understandable, but, I maintain, unnecessarily reactive. The accusation of "inauthenticity" must in part derive from an acknowledgement that bisexual subjectivity is historically and culturally formed almost exclusively in lesbian gay or straight spaces. The minimal bisexual spaces that do exist, such as bisexual conference spaces and support groups are recent, often temporary, and do not feed into a larger bisexual community. Very often, bisexual subjects come to think of themselves as such in spaces that do not recognise them in name. One could think of these issues as signs of a juvenile community, which will, in time, make its presence more clearly and visibly felt. Such a developmental perspective assumes all identities and communities develop identically, of course, that they all have the same conditions of present meaning, predicated on projected futures and retrospectively imagined pasts. It is another way of subjugating bisexual difference to a dominant history of sexual and gendered identity. I want to argue, instead, that this partiality is in fact a condition of bisexual subjectivity both historically and contemporarily, a sign of its transitivity and continually reformation. Like Donna Haraway’s "illegitimate offspring" the postmodern cyborg (A Manifesto for Cyborgs 191) a bisexual female subject may not take the same (imagined) path as her foremothers – her allegiances are never clear. A contemporary bisexual (rather than cyborg) myth is "about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work" (196).

Clearly it is not only bisexual subjectivity that is partial – all subjectivity is formed and reformed in different spaces, has a history of different sexual and non-sexual interactions that make up the particularities of location. But a focus on the specifics of bisexual partiality is useful because bisexual subjectivity is formed through its partiality, rather than that partiality being the site of its undoing. Precisely because of bisexuality’s production as "inauthentic," and the lack of separate bisexual spaces, passing as lesbian, gay or straight (whether intentionally or not) is inevitably a formative part of what it means to become bisexual. Epistemologically, the insistent partiality of bisexuality makes visible the process by which we all become sexual and gendered subjects. For example, a bisexual woman in a relationship with man embodies two central tenets of contemporary subjectivity. Firstly, she provides empirical verification of Sedgwick’s reminder that gender of object choice does not wholly determine subjectivity. Secondly, she dramatises the temporal nature of all gendered and sexual subjectivity – in order for her bisexuality to make sense to herself, she must give her subjectivity a conscious history of transition. Without making this history of transition and difference from herself conscious she would be indistinguishable to herself from a heterosexual woman. To become a bisexual subject then partiality, transition (and therefore translation of one culture into another) must be placed at the centre of subjective meaning. To argue otherwise, I suggest, is to elide the specificities that constitute bisexual experience and give rise to bisexual knowledge.

To turn to the notion of consistent presence, my concern with partiality in the formation of bisexual subjectivity has also lead me to reject the assertion that bisexual history has been elided or repressed (Garber). My research suggests that bisexuals are in fact everywhere present, not necessarily in a body blazoned with bisexual banners and flanked by lovers of both sexes, but within the cultural and political spaces that take other identities’ name. In addition, the boundaries for feminist or queer community are frequently marked by the consideration of bisexual inclusion (whatever the result of that consideration), and the specificities of lesbian and gay identity ensured by comparison with real or imagined bisexual subjects. Thus, the question of bisexual subjectivity emerges as a fundamental concern of contemporary feminist, lesbian and gay and queer politics, culture and theory. To insist on a discrete and traceable bisexual identity is to miss the social and political conditions that determine its current emergence, as well as the complexities of interaction and community that mark bisexual subjectivity in those moments where it does emergence as distinct. Instead, I investigate the particular conjunctions of differences that give rise to contemporary bisexual meaning whether or not a visible bisexual identity is a result of those differences.

Partial Methodologies

Bisexual partiality also has its effect on my research methodology. Following Probyn and Braidotti once more, I have come to realise that the nuances of bisexual experience can only be glimpsed through a spatial, or cartographic, approach that prioritises juxtaposition over displacement, genealogy over linear history, transition over permanence or indeed systematic progressive agendas. My primary materials include newspaper articles, photographs, interview transcripts, political flyers, letters, personal experience, audio-taped workshops, audio visual materials, fiction, feminist and queer theory, newsletters, and a host of other archive material from a number of different geographical locations. And I have combined a range of contemporary feminist and lesbian and gay/queer critical and discursive approaches with those of cultural geography, oral and community history and social analysis. The fact that the texts I engage with are so disparate is not accidental. I believe that the eclectic, piecemeal nature of the body of my research is true to the conditions of bisexual partiality and constitutes a necessary "cultural theft". My genealogy of bisexuality is, in effect, a process of scavenging from "other" locations, to flesh out a bisexual subject whose presence in those locations has been difficult to trace from a more conventional historical perspective.

The first part of my genealogy of bisexual spaces tracks the ways bisexuality has been produced as structural middle ground between, the "tie that binds" sexed, gendered and sexual poles, a dominant knowledge that locates bisexuality as either transgressive of these binaries, or alternatively as responsible for their maintenance. A second direction considers specific cultural formations of bisexuality in local and national contexts, as a point of marked contrast to the theoretical abstractions discussed. I am interested in those moments and histories where bisexuality is either not produced as middle-ground between heterosexuality and homosexuality, but as a subset of either of these, for example, or as the middle-ground between lesbian and gay male spaces. The importance of such cultural spaces (which I briefly describe below) is that they allow us to conceive of bisexuality as something other than middle ground based on bisexuality as potential or sexed/gendered merging: as practice or behaviour negotiated in relation to a range of different communities and experiences. I track bisexuality as an emergent subjecthood, in other words, and bisexual knowledge as traceable but not known in advance.

The spaces I am concerned with are the following. Firstly, I explore bisexual women’s location in Northampton, Massachusetts, drawing a cartography of bisexual activism and practice in this lesbian town known as "Lesbianville, USA." I trace the oscillation between bisexual women’s desire and identity in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in the context of debates on the inclusion of the term "bisexual" in the annual Northampton Lesbian and Gay Pride March. How do bisexual women and lesbians share the same spaces? I am particularly interested in the mechanisms used to set up women’s bisexuality and lesbianism as separate from one another, and in the extent and implications of the "success" of the desire for named bisexual recognition. Secondly, I chart the location of bisexuality through its association with transsexuality within contemporary US queer and feminist social, political and theoretical geographies. How are bisexuality and transsexuality placed and to what (or whose) ends? What effects does the association of bisexuality with transsexuality have on emergent bisexual and transsexual subjectivities? This approach deliberately foregrounds the fact that cultural space is not necessarily geographically locatable, that contemporary theories of sexuality and gender constitute a distinct space of differences within which bisexual subjectivity takes shape (Ingram, Boutillette and Retter 13). Thirdly, I interrogate the development of national bisexual conferences as "uniquely bisexual spaces," with a specific focus on the 1st National Bisexual Conference in San Francisco in 1990. I delineate the discursive formation of "the bisexual" in one of the few specifically bisexual spaces, asking how such a space is staked out and how the bisexual subject of that space is articulated.

Tracing concrete bisexual manifestations provides both a critique of what we think we already know about bisexuality, and a fresh challenge to the presumption that heterosexuality and homosexuality, masculinity and femininity, male and female reside in clear opposition to one another. If bisexuality can be located "elsewhere," what uncharted heterosexual and lesbian or gay knowledges might also emerge?

Bisexual Reflexivity

Thus far, I have been concerned with bisexual epistemology and methodology, paying little attention of the role of researcher in articulating the bisexual experiences I am interested in. The final part of my paper examines my own impact on the bisexual research I have engaged in, and more particularly the impact bisexual research has had on my own bisexual subjectivity. I want, here, to pay attention to the shifting locations I variously occupy through the sexual and gendered landscapes I inhabit, and the bisexual knowledges that emerge from the resonance of differences and similarities between field and researcher. To a large extent, my focus on the particular sexual spaces outlined above is a reflection of my own interests and investments. The spaces I choose to explore are familiar ones I have traversed or immersed myself in. I am not a dispassionate flâneur. I provide one particular link between the three spaces, I am one of these spaces "own skein[s]" (Foucault 22), since I have lived in both Northampton and San Francisco, and have been a part of transgendered communities in the US and the UK. My own sense of self as bisexual has been negotiated in relation to these lesbian, gay, queer and transgendered social and political spaces.

I should also note here that I could think of nothing worse than my particular genealogies being thought of as exhaustive of the range of contemporary bisexual knowledges. Clearly this cannot be the case, and I look forward to tracing the production of bisexual knowledges in a range of additional "scapes" at future points. Of course, the relationship between researcher and researched is an ongoing one too. Historian Dell Upton writes evocatively of this process that, "an individual’s perception of a landscape changes with the experience of moving through it" (Upton 357). My thinking about bisexuality, and indeed my sense of bisexual self, has changed due to my travels in and through these particular sexual and gendered landscapes. "Space is, after all, a form of representation" (Colomina i) – the spaces I trace are thus not only an attempt to locate bisexuality, but a representation of my own shifting location. Given that I am committed to understanding experience as formed in the interfaces among different voices and locations, and that my own voice and location is not absent, I cannot ignore the fact that the tracking of this voice/location is one of the primary findings of my research.

My search for bisexual experience in the lesbian context of Northampton, Massachusetts, is quite explicitly framed by my own experience of living there. The first part of that chapter begins with my description of an informal walk through the town, and ends with a discussion of the lesbian household I became a part of. Throughout the chapter my concern is with the ways bisexual women are included within and excluded from lesbian spaces. The narrative ostensibly traces the shift from what I identify as initial bisexual inclusion within lesbian community, to the separation of bisexual identity through naming. In a direct mirroring of this trajectory I initially wander the streets of Northampton as an outsider searching for bisexual community, in vain, and end up with a sense of my own inclusion within a miniature lesbian community. At the close of the chapter there remains a contradiction between the "resolution" of the Pride March Controversy through bisexual naming, and the apparent lack of bisexual visibility during my stay in Northampton. Yet my own movement towards rather than away from inclusion within lesbian community could perhaps be seen as providing alternative closure, suggesting a lack of stable location for bisexuality as a form of inclusion rather than loss.

In the following chapter on bisexuality and transsexuality in feminist and queer spaces, my personal trajectory is more problematic. The methodological use of the personal is, from the outset, motivated by my invested relationship to the subject. At the time of conducting the research for this chapter, my involvement with my FTM lover provides a particular perspective on the relationship between bisexual and transsexual subjectivity. My interest in the historical and theoretical merging of bisexuality and transsexuality is persistently mediated through my desire, both to affirm and to separate the linked but different trajectories I analyse. Here, perhaps more than anywhere else in the research, my own subjectivity is implicated in the production of bisexuality (and transsexuality) as either regressive or transgressive. I argue for bisexual and transsexual subjectivity as wrongly inscribed by this dyad, thus preparing the way for a triumphant and romantic bi/trans escape from the confining gaze of the mythical, malicious reader. ‘Read with me’, I say, all the while refusing that possibility. I want, clearly, to map out a visible escape route from the normative middle ground, from the dominant structures of gender and sexuality, within which (my) bisexual and (his) transsexual subjectivity have no mobility. In the final chapter, I attempt to take an uncharacteristic critical distance from my subject – the consolidation of bisexual identity and community through the 1990 Bisexual Conference in San Francisco. This is a deliberate move on my part. It seems quite clear to me from this research, and from the subsequent development of US bisexual conferences that the consolidation of bisexual space occurs here through an incorporation, rather than critique of the production of bisexuality as transgressive. My desire in this chapter is to highlight the historical construction of separate bisexual space, how it undercuts itself, rather than damning from outside. In that sense I am conscious throughout the text of my presence there as an academic rather than "political activist." In maintaining such a fictional, and perhaps even parodic distance, the ways in which bisexual separation and visibility work to reaffirm rather than contest productions of bisexuality as middle ground, can be brought to the reader’s attention. The consolidation of the middle ground of bisexuality makes a range of bisexual historical and personal narratives invisible, while privileging others.

Along with post-structuralist feminist epistemologists I want to argue that if we are looking for transition and relocation in the formation of gendered and sexual subjectivity, we should not be daunted by the realisation of inconsistencies and contradictions within a particular genealogy. And certainly we should least of all be surprised by the emergence of bisexual knowledges and experiences that reproduce rather than clearly resist dominant sexual and gendered discourses. If as feminist theorists, we are to take seriously the assertion that subjectivity is an ongoing project rather than an a priori state of being, an engagement with and effect of difference and interaction, we must also expect that subjectivity to be unstable as well as revolutionary, fearful and generous, accepting as well as challenging. Rather than viewing (this) bisexual experience as discontinuous, as jumping randomly from one location to another, the task is to link the different conditions of to form a genealogy that unmasks the power-relations at play in the formation production of bisexual subjectivity.

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